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This article analyses the relations between the international
specialization pattern and growth. For this purpose, it adopts
as its analytical framework the recent literature emphasizing
the importance of initial conditions and public policies, and
not only factor endowment. It also analyses the empirical
and economic policy implications of this approach. After
an introduction (section I), section II presents the analytical
framework: a model with two internationally tradeable goods
sectors and a non-tradeable inputs sector, with increasing
returns to scale and dynamic pecuniary externalities. Section
III draws the implications of the analysis in terms of the
effects that industrial policies can have on the specialization
pattern and the growth rate, while section IV does the same
with respect to the initial conditions and real and monetary
shocks. Section V examines the empirical information on
the relations between the specialization pattern, the capital
accumulation rate and growth, and finally section VI sums
up the main conclusions of the study with regard to the scope
and limitations of industrial policy.
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I
Introduction
In the literature (both old and new) on international
trade, there are a number of contributions which analyse
the way in which the international trade specialization
pattern can affect growth: the “infant industry”
argument, Prebisch’s and Singer’s theories on the terms
of trade of primary commodities, or the multisectoral
models with different rates of learning in the new
international trade theory. A common feature of these
contributions is that the specialization pattern of an
economy, as determined by its comparative advantages,
may not be the same as the specialization pattern
giving the greatest economic benefits in the long term.
This may be because the static comparative advantages
of the economy do not coincide with its dynamic
comparative advantages, because of technological
externalities associated with learning processes, or
because the evolution of the terms of trade is such
that the economy would do better to abandon the
specialization pattern associated with static
comparative advantages. In this case, an industrial
policy which reallocates resources to the sectors with
dynamic advantages, through subsidies or customs
tariffs, is justified if there are flaws in the factor
markets (especially the lack of a perfect capital
market).
There is another way of approaching the subject
of the way in which the specialization pattern can affect
the long-term growth rate, that is, when a given factor
endowment does not mean that there is only one
possible specialization pattern and the different
specialization patterns consistent with the same factor
endowment have different dynamic effects. This may
be due to the existence of dynamic pecuniary
externalities associated with different linkages with
sectors of goods which are not tradeable, or only
imperfectly tradeable, on the international market. In
this case, there is not a conflict between static and
dynamic comparative advantages which could, in
theory, be satisfactorily solved if the capital market were
perfect. There is rather a difference between a very high
capital yield on a set of coordinated investments and
the yield that could be obtained by an individual investor
and which is very low or insufficient to shift capital to
the sectors with high growth potential. When the
economy specializes in a less dynamic pattern, the
problem is thus due to a lack of coordination. Recent
models based on this approach may be found in Rodrik
(1995), Rodríguez-Clare (1996), Ciccone and
Matsuyama (1996), Skott and Ros (1997) and Ros
(2000, chapter 9). It hardly seems necessary to note
that the subject is closely linked with the debates on
the role played by industrial policy in the examples of
rapid growth after the war and the recent empirical
literature on the effects of the international trade
specialization pattern on the growth rate (Matsuyama,
1992; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997).
II
The analytical framework
In neoclassical theory, the pattern of specialization is
unequivocally determined by the factor endowment of
the economy (along with technology and the terms of
trade) because, regardless of the initial conditions, the
economy is assumed to converge towards a pattern of
specialization which can be explained by the factor
endowment. At the other extreme of the theoretical
scale, some models in the new international trade theory
consider productivity growth to be the result of learning
processes and leave out factor endowment as a
determinant of comparative advantages (see, for
example, Krugman, 1987). In this case, the
specialization pattern cannot be determined
independently of the initial conditions and past history.
Accidents –that is to say, disturbances in the real sphere,
such as a temporary boom in natural resources, or
monetary disturbances such as temporary exchange rate
overvaluation– are of decisive importance in
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determining the pattern of specialization. Industrial
policy also becomes of crucial importance in the
acquisition of new comparative advantages. The model
presented in this section may be seen as an extension
of a neoclassical model which admits the existence of
increasing returns to scale in the production of non-
tradeable inputs, or as a model based on the new
international trade theory –like that of Krugman (1987)
on the “competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher”–
which discards the assumption of Ricardian-type
technology and introduces non-tradeable goods. As we
shall see, in these conditions the factor endowment, the
initial conditions and the policies adopted all play a
role in determining the specialization pattern.
1. The basic model
Let us consider an economy with three sectors. Sector
1 produces a tradeable good using capital and labour,
on competitive conditions and with constant returns to
scale. Sector 2 also produces a tradeable good, using
capital and non-tradeable inputs (we are leaving out
the labour factor for the purpose of simplicity and in
order to emphasize that what this sector is producing,
on competitive conditions and with constant returns to
scale, is a good which makes intensive use of capital).
In both sectors, the technology used is of the Cobb-
Douglas type. Sector 3 produces the non-tradeable
inputs used in sector 2. These inputs are produced using
labour and with increasing returns to scale. These
intermediate goods can represent a set of manufactured
inputs and production services (such as banking and
insurance services), as in the model used in Rodríguez-
Clare (1996), or they can be a set of infrastructural
goods and services (energy, transport and
communications), as in Skott and Ros (1997). Formally,
input I of the set of intermediate goods Ii may be
represented as:
Ι = (Σ (1/n) Iiσ)1/σ 0 < σ < 1,
where n is the number of intermediate goods, assumed
to be a given value.
Alternatively, sector 3 may be considered as an
industry assembling a set of components Ii produced
under conditions of increasing returns:1
I = na (Σ (1/n) Iiσ)1/σ a > 1 0 < σ < 1,
where I is the output of sector 3 and n is the number
(not fixed) of components produced. In this case, we
interpret each of these components as a link in the
production process. An increase in the number of
components means a finer division of labour. Because
of the existence of economies of specialization, this
greater division of labour makes it more productive,
by increasing differentiation and generating new
processes and auxiliary industries (see Kaldor, 1967,
p. 14). There are two differences between this
specification of sector 3 and the previous one. Firstly,
the economies (of specialization) taken into account
here are external to the enterprise, unlike the economies
of scale, internal to the plant, described in the first
specification. This is what the second specification
implies: as the parameter a is greater than one, an
increase of x% in the number of components, keeping
(n Ii) constant, generates more units of I than an increase
of x% in each component, keeping n constant. Secondly,
in the present specification the number of intermediate
goods, instead of being given, is endogenous and is
determined by the size of the market for sector 3.
In the following sections, the presentation will be
based on the first specification, characterized by the
presence of internal economies of scale, although
qualitatively similar results can be obtained using the
second specification. At all events, the key difference
between sectors 1 and 2 is that whereas sector 2 has a
backward linkage with the sector producing inputs,
there are no linkages in the case of sector 1. The
integrated sector 2 and 3 may be seen as a “production
complex” characterized, as we shall see, by effects
which are external to each one of the two sectors that
make it up.
a) Multiple equilibria and pecuniary externalities
In an economy like that considered here, under certain
conditions there can be multiple market equilibria. A
formal analysis of the existence of multiple equilibria
is given in the appendix. Here, we will limit ourselves
to describing the basic assumption. In order to
understand why there are multiple equilibria, we may
begin by noting that an equilibrium in which sectors 1
and 2 exist side by side is an unstable equilibrium. Thus,
let us imagine an economy in which the two tradeable
goods sectors exist side by side and both have the same
levels of profitability. In this situation, the reallocation
of a small amount of capital to sector 2 has the effect of
increasing its relative profitability, for the expansion
of the market for sector 3 (associated with the
reallocation of capital to sector 2) tends to reduce the
cost of producing the intermediate goods in question,
1 This is what is known as Dixit-Stiglitz and Ethier’s specification
(see Ethier, 1982).
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with a favourable effect on the rate of profitability of
sector 2. This increase in the relative profitability of
sector 2 causes capital to flow to it and hence further
increases its rate of profitability. In contrast, reallocation
of capital to sector 1 has the opposite effect of reducing
the relative profitability of sector 2, by reducing the
size of the market for sector 3 and raising the cost of
producing intermediate goods. The capital therefore
tends to flow to sector 1, further increasing its relative
profitability. In both cases the process continues up to
the point of the complete disappearance of one of the
two tradeable goods sectors and total specialization of
the economy in the other sector.
The second thing to be noted is that an equilibrium
with specialization in sector 1 always exists in the
economy in question, regardless of whether there are
multiple equilibria or not. When the levels of capital
invested in sector 2 are low, the profitability of the sector
tends towards zero, because of the high cost of
producing the necessary intermediate goods, but it
continues to be positive in sector 1, whatever the level
of the stock of capital. There are therefore some
allocations of capital, if the levels of capital invested in
sector 2 are sufficiently low, in which sector 1 is more
profitable than sector 2. As we shall see below, the fact
that there is always an equilibrium with specialization
in sector 1 is due to the assumption that that sector does
not use inputs produced by sector 3.
As there is always an equilibrium with
specialization in sector 1, it follows that the existence
of an equilibrium with specialization in sector 2 ensures
the existence of multiple equilibria. There is an
equilibrium with specialization in sector 2 if the
profitability of that sector, when all the capital is
invested in it, is greater than that of sector 1 (taking
account of the market equilibrium wage when the entire
labour force is employed in sector 3). As demonstrated
in the appendix, the existence of such an equilibrium
depends on the capital and labour endowments of the
economy and the terms of trade between sectors 1 and
2. In particular, in order for there to be an equilibrium
with specialization in sector 2, the total stock of capital
must be large enough to ensure that, when it is entirely
invested in sector 2, the prices of the intermediate goods
must be low enough and the wages high enough to make
sector 2, which makes intensive use of capital and
inputs, more profitable than sector 1, which makes
intensive use of labour. The higher the relative price of
the goods produced by sector 1 (with respect to those
of sector 2), the greater the size of the stock of capital
needed for there to be multiple equilibria, since that
higher price increases the relative profitability of sector
1. The size of the stock of capital needed also increases
with the number of enterprises n in the intermediate
goods sector, which adversely affects the productivity
of sector 3 and the profitability of sector 2.2
The existence of multiple equilibria is associated
with the presence of pecuniary externalities (although
the presence of such externalities is not of itself a
sufficient condition, since there may be a single
equilibrium with specialization in sector 1). Thus, the
existence of increasing returns to scale in the
intermediate goods sector means that production
decisions in sector 3 and investment decisions in sector
2 have significant external effects. An increase in the
production of one of the intermediate goods adversely
affects demand for other inputs, but it lowers the price
of the overall set of intermediate goods and increases
both the total input of intermediate goods and the rate
of profitability of sector 2. In addition to these static
effects, there is also a dynamic externality: higher
profitability of sector 2 encourages capital accumulation
in that sector and leads to an increase in future demand
for intermediate goods. On the investment side, the
atomized producers in sector 2 take all prices as given
and do not take into account the external effects that
the greater stock of capital has on future demand for
intermediate goods or the tendency for the prices of
those goods to go down as the production costs of sector
3 are reduced.
As a result of these dynamic pecuniary
externalities, an economy specializing in sector 1 will
be trapped in that specialization pattern if all the
enterprises follow a line of behaviour which is rational
for each of them. As all the capital is invested in sector
1, the demand for intermediate goods is non-existent
and the production costs of those goods are extremely
high. Consequently, the profitability of sector 2 is so
low that the capital is invested in sector 1. This keeps
the production costs of sector 3 high and lowers the
profitability of sector 2.
b) The two patterns of specialization compared
Why does it matter if the economy is trapped in a trade
pattern specializing in sector 1? The reason is that the
two specialization patterns are not equivalent in terms
of economic well-being (nor, as we shall see below, in
2 This conclusion does not apply to the model with the second
specification of sector 3, in which the number of enterprises is
endogenous and positively affects the productivity of the sector.
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terms of growth potential). As demonstrated in the ap-
pendix, the existence of multiple equilibria ensures that
the rate of profitability is higher in the equilibrium spe-
cializing in sector 2, provided that that sector makes
more intensive use of capital than sector 1. It may be
assumed that the high level of the stock of capital
needed for there to be multiple equilibria will generate
relatively high wages, and this will tend to depress the
rate of profitability of sector 1, which makes intensive
use of labour. On the other hand, at sufficiently high
levels of capital stock, real wages are also higher in the
equilibrium specializing in sector 2, for at sufficiently
high levels of capital stock the greater scale of sector 3
will have made this sector more productive and reduced
the relative price of the intermediate goods produced.
As a result, as the stock of capital increases the capital/
intermediate inputs ratio in the output of sector 2 tends
to go down, and the expansion of sector 2 at the ex-
pense of sector 1 generates an excess of demand for
labour, with a positive impact on real wages.
2. Extensions
a) The model involving the use of inputs in sector 1
In the previous model, the technology available in sector
1 does not use intermediate goods. Let us now assume,
however, that sector 1 does use intermediate goods,
although less intensively than sector 2.3  The demand
for intermediate goods no longer comes exclusively
from sector 2 and therefore does not depend on the
amount of capital invested in it. The capital invested in
sector 1 now also affects the demand for intermediate
goods and, ultimately, the relative price of those goods
with respect to those produced by sector 2.
Consequently, the profitability of sector 2 will now
depend not only on the capital invested and the wages
in that sector, but also on the capital invested in sector
1 and, hence, the total stock of capital. This means that
there will be a sufficiently high value of the stock of
capital which, when the whole of that stock is invested
in sector 1, will make the relative price of the
intermediate goods sufficiently low and wages
sufficiently high to cause the rate of profitability of
sector 2 to be higher than that of sector 1, both rates
being calculated at the market equilibrium values for
wages and intermediate goods. When the total stock of
capital reaches that value, the equilibrium with
specialization in sector 1 disappears, since sector 2 is
more profitable than sector 1 even when the whole of
the capital is invested in the latter. Unlike the previous
model, it is no longer true that there is always an
equilibrium with specialization in sector 1, whatever
the size of the total stock of capital.
We now have three configurations. First, for a range
of low values of the capital stock there is a single
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the economy
specializes in the production of tradeable goods in
sector 1, and a small sector 3 exists side by side with
sector 1. The trade specialization must be in sector 1,
not sector 2, because sector 1 is the sector which uses
intermediate goods least intensively and is therefore
the only one capable of surviving with the high
production costs prevailing in the intermediate goods
sector.
In a range of intermediate values of the capital
stock, there are two stable equilibria, with specialization
in sector 1 and sector 2 respectively. The total stock of
capital is sufficiently large to generate a productive
intermediate goods sector and make sector 2 viable,
but only if the capital is invested in sector 2. If the capital
is invested in sector 1, the intermediate goods market
will not be sufficient to make investing in sector 2
profitable. In the equilibrium with specialization in
sector 2, however, the rate of profitability is greater and
the real wage is at least as high as in the equilibrium
with specialization in sector 1. The equilibrium with
specialization in sector 2 is therefore superior in terms
of Pareto’s cr iterion to the equilibrium with
specialization in sector 1, not just for a certain minimum
value of the capital stock but for the whole range of
values of the capital stock where there are multiple
equilibria.
Finally, for large values of the capital stock we have
a single equilibrium once more. The capital stock is
sufficiently large not only to make sector 2 viable but
also to cause the equilibrium with specialization in
sector 1 to disappear. The low prices of intermediate
goods and high wages make it profitable for individual
investors to shift from sector 1 to sector 2, even when
all the capital is initially invested in sector 1. When
this is done, the prices of intermediate goods and wages
move in such a way as to strengthen the relative
profitability of sector 2, and eventually the whole of
the capital shifts to that sector. Sector 1 becomes non-
viable because of the high wages associated with the
relatively high capital/labour ratio of the economy.
3 This is the case analysed by Rodríguez-Clare (1996), in a model
similar to that presented in the appendix. As well as providing for
the use of intermediate inputs in sector 1, Rodríguez-Clare’s model
adopts Dixit-Stiglitz and Ethier’s specification for sector 3 instead
of the specification with a fixed number of intermediate inputs.
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b) The model with skilled labour in the intermediate
goods sector
Let us now assume that the technology employed in
sector 3 uses skilled labour (whereas sector 1 uses
unskilled labour).4  Together with the size of the capital
stock, the level of skills of the labour force thus becomes
a further factor influencing the existence of multiple
equilibria, for a higher level of skills may make up for
the high costs resulting from a small market for
intermediate goods produced under conditions of
increasing returns and thus tends to reduce the size of
the capital stock required for there to be an equilibrium
with specialization in sector 2. Similar conclusions may
be reached if it is sector 2, rather than sector 3, which
makes intensive use of skilled labour: whereas the high
price of intermediate goods tends to depress the relative
profitability of sector 2, an abundance of skilled labour
tends to increase it, so that sector 2 can be viable
depending on the allocation of the capital stock. At all
events, the existence of multiple equilibria can be the
result of different mixes of levels of skills and capital
stocks, rather than simply a range of intermediate values
of the capital stock.
III
Industrial policy and growth
Many developing countries have adopted industrial
policies in an attempt to speed up the rate of
industrialization and the economic growth rate. The
results have been mixed, judging from the variety of
different results obtained using similar policies. This
explains why the efficacy of these policies is a matter
of controversy and why there are different opinions as
to whether these policies have made a difference and,
if so, whether their effects have been positive or
negative. This is so even though both observers and
policy-makers have amply documented the role of
industrial policy in achieving the rapid industrialization
of East Asia (see Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). This
situation goes a long way towards explaining why there
is no consensus on the key question of how, and in what
conditions, industrial policy can significantly alter the
rates of capital accumulation and growth. The analytical
framework set forth earlier in this article sheds some
light on this question, as we shall see below.
Let us begin by noting that in neoclassical
international trade theory factor endowment,
technology and the terms of trade are considered to
unequivocally determine the pattern of comparative
advantages and specialization of an economy. In the
analytical framework presented in the previous section,
in contrast, the existence of multiple market equilibria
associated with different patterns of specialization but
with the same factor endowment, technology and terms
of trade makes the very notion of comparative
advantage ambiguous. More exactly, when a single
equilibrium exists, regardless of whether it is with
specialization in sector 1 or 2, it makes sense to say
that the economy displays a comparative advantage in
the corresponding sector, and the market incentives will
induce the economy to specialize in the sector which
has a comparative advantage. When there are multiple
equilibria, however, there is longer a clear answer to
the question of where the comparative advantage in
trade lies. It could be said (using a phrase which would
make no sense in the context of neoclassical theory)
that the economy is in a state of transition between a
pattern of comparative advantages which has
disappeared and another which has not yet emerged.
The different specialization patterns associated
with the same factor endowment have different growth
implications. Let us consider, for example, the model
with intermediate inputs in the two tradeable goods
sectors and assume that the conditions for the existence
of multiple equilibria are fulfilled. We will compare
two economies which are identical in all aspects (factor
endowment, rate of saving, size of the labour force)
except their pattern of specialization, since one is
specialized in sector 1 and the other in sector 2. As we
have seen earlier, real wages and the rate of profitability
are higher in the second economy. Consequently, this
economy will also have a higher per capita income, so
4 A similar case is analysed by Rodrik (1995). In the present
analysis, the existence of multiple equilibria is associated with a
relatively high level of skills of the labour force, together with a
relatively small stock of capital.
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that for the same rate of saving and investment it will
have higher rates of capital accumulation and growth.
The superiority of the growth rate of the economy
specializing in sector 2 will be even greater if there is
international capital mobility, since this capital will tend
to flow to the economy offering the highest return on
capital and that economy’s rate of investment will
therefore tend to be higher.
This means that if an economy is specialized in
sector 1, an industrial policy which reallocates resources
to sectors 2 and 3, leading to a specialization pattern
based on those sectors, will raise the growth rate of the
economy. Moreover, in the absence of an industrial
policy an economy specializing in sector 1 will not
move spontaneously towards the high-growth
equilibrium. With the prices and wages prevailing in
the equilibrium with specialization in sector 1, the rate
of profitability of sector 2 will be below that of sector
1, and no individual investor will find it profitable to
invest in sector 2. Individual incentives, as measured
by the market, will keep the economy on the low growth
path associated with specialization in sector 1, as long
as that equilibrium persists. Only when a sufficiently
large mass of investors shift simultaneously to sectors
2 and 3 will the profitability of sector 2 be more
attractive than that offered by sector 1. However, this
requires policy interventions in order to provide the
necessary coordination among producers.
It is quite true that eventually the economy
specializing in sector 1 will obtain a comparative
advantage in sector 2 through the capital accumulation
process itself. When that happens, the profitability of
sector 2 will be greater than that of sector 1 and the
market incentives will lead the economy to specialize
in sector 2, since the equilibrium with specialization in
sector 1 will have disappeared. During the transition to
the stock of capital needed for this to happen, however,
an economy which specialized in sector 2 from the start
will have a higher growth rate. The high and sustained
growth rate of the East Asian economies may be
understood as the result of a succession of policy
interventions which speeded up the transitions between
different patterns of production and international trade
specialization. It is hard to imagine how a development
model driven primarily by the market forces, such as
the developing countries are currently being
recommended to adopt, can pass through these
transitions so successfully. This is not because there
are no examples of successes based on the market (this
is open to debate), but because theory suggests exactly
the opposite: that the market incentives can hardly solve
efficaciously (or at least efficiently) the problems of
coordination that arise in the transition.
Successful policy interventions aimed at speeding
up the transition form the basis for Rodrik’s
interpretation of how Korea and Taiwan became rich
(Rodrik, 1995; see also Amsden, 1989, and Wade,
1990). The argument is that, rather than their export
orientation, the distinctive feature of these examples
of growth was the sharp and sustained increase in their
investment rates in the early 1960s. Through a variety
of policy interventions, subsidizing and coordinating
investment projects, government policy succeeded in
reallocating resources to modern industries making
intensive use of capital and skilled labour. With growing
returns in these activities, such reallocation raised the
profitability of capital and propelled the economy
towards a high growth path. Outward orientation was a
consequence of this, because the higher rates of
investment increased the demand for imported capital
goods. The relatively high level of skills of the labour
force in both countries was a necessary condition for
the success of the industrial policy adopted.
At the same time, the analysis made shows the
limitations of industrial policy when the conditions
needed for its success (the existence of multiple
equilibria) are absent. Let us assume that there is a single
equilibrium in the economy, with specialization in
sector 1. In this case, industrial policy cannot improve
the results of the market forces. Let us consider, for
example, a policy which seeks to reallocate resources
to sectors 2 and 3. Let us assume that this policy is
successful in reallocating new investments to sector 2.
Precisely because there is no equilibrium with
specialization in sector 2, wages in this economy will
fall compared with their value for equilibrium with
specialization in sector 1. Profitability will also tend to
fall, because the stock of capital is small and the costs
of the intermediate goods produced are therefore high.
With a rate of profitability in sector 2 which is less
than that of sector 1 (at market prices and wages), the
changes in relative prices which must be induced in
order to make sector 2 viable would mean an even
greater fall in real wages. On the other hand, when
there is a single equilibrium with specialization in
sector 2 an industrial policy is not needed. The
economy has a clear comparative advantage in sector
2, and the market incentives will of themselves lead
the economy to adopt the specialization pattern with
the highest growth path.
This means that the existence of externalities is
not sufficient to justify an industrial policy. When
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industrial policy cannot do anything to improve the
market results (when there is only an equilibrium with
specialization in sector 1) or is actually unnecessary
(when there is only an equilibrium with specialization
in sector 2) this is due ultimately to the fact that, as we
saw earlier in this article, the presence of static and
dynamic externalities is not sufficient to ensure the
existence of multiple equilibria.
This analysis has other interesting connotations.
In the literature on the effects of industrial policy, the
variety of results obtained has tended to be associated
with the variety of policies adopted (see for example
Amsden, 1989). Thus, for example, the success of the
industrial policies applied in East Asia compared with
the less successful results obtained in Latin America
has been associated with the fact that in the first case
the incentives for firms or sectors were granted in
exchange for the attainment of clearly defined goals,
and the time horizon for the operation of the policies
was clearly delimited. These differences undoubtedly
must have contributed to the success of the Asian model,
but our analysis also suggests that the success of an
industrial policy depends very much on the existence
of the necessary conditions for its application. A single
given industrial policy may be effective or not,
depending on this. In this context, it is easy to
understand the importance that the initial level of skills
of the labour force in the East Asian countries had for
their emergence as industrialized countries in the early
1960s. This relatively high level of skills had existed
for a long time before, but it only became crucial later
on, when it gave viability to an industrial policy which
reallocated resources to modern sectors making
intensive use of physical and human capital. Our
analysis also makes it possible to understand the role
played by the particular design of industrial policies in
East Asia. By limiting the time horizon and the
incentives offered, these policies incorporated self-
correction mechanisms. If the conditions needed for
the industrial policy to be effective were lacking, its
lack of viability was clearly evident as soon as it began
to be applied. This made it possible to turn back and
thus minimize the loss of resources that persistence with
a non-viable policy would have involved.
IV
The terms of trade and the “Dutch Disease”
The size of the capital stock and the level of skills of
the labour force are not the only factors affecting the
existence of multiple specialization patterns. As already
mentioned, the existence of multiple equilibria also
depends on the terms of trade between the goods
produced by sectors 1 and 2. In order to illustrate the
role of these terms, let us consider an economy
specializing in the labour-intensive sector (sector 1),
and let us assume that with the passage of time the entry
onto the international market of new producers with
low wage costs tends to reduce the relative prices of
labour-intensive goods. This has the effect of generating
an equilibrium with specialization in sector 2, without
this necessarily causing the economy to shift to that
higher-growth equilibrium. In a way, the economy is
losing its competitiveness in sector 1, without however
acquiring a comparative advantage in sector 2. This
situation corresponds to that of a number of semi-
industrialized countries which on the one hand are
facing strong competition from new low-wage
producers of labour-intensive goods, while on the other
they are not as yet capable of competing with the more
efficient producers of capital-intensive goods in the
industrialized countries. If we interpret sector 1 as a
sector producing primary commodities, this transition
describes the balance of payments problems and the
eventual beginning of industrialization of countries with
abundant natural resources which are facing a
deterioration in the terms of trade of their exports of
primary commodities.
Whichever of these interpretations is adopted, the
transitional economy whose terms of trade have become
unfavourable will continue to specialize in the goods
produced by sector 1 (primary commodities or labour-
intensive goods) until it may reach the high levels of
capital which make sector 2 profitable from the point
of view of individual investors (unless right from the
start the drop in the prices of the goods produced by
sector 1 is so great that it eliminates the equilibrium
with specialization in sector 1). This is so simply
because the equilibrium with specialization in sector 1
is a locally stable equilibrium: no individual investor
135C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 3  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 1
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND GROWTH  •  JAIME ROS
alone will find the investment opportunities in sector 2
more attractive than those in sector 1. In the transitional
period, the economy will suffer a reduction in its growth
rate as a result of the decline in the relative price of
sector 1’s goods. As equations [7] and [14] in the
appendix show, the rate of profitability in that economy
is an inverse function of the relative price of the goods
produced in sector 2. Insofar as the rate of accumulation
depends on this profitability, the reduction in the relative
price of the goods produced by sector 1 will adversely
affect capital accumulation and growth. In turn, the
lower rate of accumulation will prolong the transition
to the level of capital stock needed to make the
production of goods in sector 2 spontaneously
profitable. When there is such a “slow growth trap”,
economic policy intervention may make a substantial
difference in the medium-term growth rate.
Another implication of the analysis confirms the
fears expressed in the literature on the “Dutch Disease”
(for a review of this literature, see Corden, 1984). Let
us assume that sector 1 is natural resource-intensive
and the economy is specialized in sector 2. With the
initial terms of trade and capital stock there are multiple
equilibria. Starting from this situation, the relative price
of sector 1’s goods subsequently rises to such a point
that sector 1 is more profitable than sector 2, so that
the equilibrium with specialization in sector 2
disappears. This shifts resources from sectors 2 and 3
to sector 1 and the economy becomes specialized in
sector 1. Later on, the relative price of sector 1’s goods
returns to its initial level, causing the reappearance of
the equilibrium with specialization in sector 2, but there
is not a corresponding shift in resources to sectors 2
and 3. The economy continues to be specialized in
sector 1 because, as we assumed, with the initial terms
of trade there are multiple equilibria and the profitability
of sector 1 is therefore greater than that which an
individual investor can obtain in sector 2 when the
economy is specialized in sector 1. The boom in natural
resources, although only temporary, has had permanent
effects on the specialization pattern of the economy and
the long-term growth rate.
V
Empirical evidence5
1. Trade specialization and growth
The main conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing
analysis is that the specialization pattern is a
determining factor in the economic growth rate. There
are two channels by which this influence is exerted.
Firstly (controlling for other factors), the capital yield,
and hence the investment rate, tend to be higher in the
specialization pattern based on industries with
increasing returns. Secondly, for the same level of
income per worker, specialization in industries with
increasing returns is associated with a higher product/
capital ratio. This means that, even if the rates of
investment are the same, the rates of capital
accumulation and growth will be higher when the
economy is specialized in industries with growing
returns. Let us now look at the empirical validity of
these relations.
It is worth noting, first of all, that the reallocation
of resources to modern industries making intensive use
of capital and skilled labour was accompanied in South
Korea and Taiwan, as predicted in our analytical
framework, with an increase in capital yields (and also
in the rate of investment). In South Korea, profit rates
in manufacturing rose from 16% in 1954-1956 to 28%
in 1957-1962 and 35% in 1963-1970 (Hong, 1993, cited
by Rodrik, 1995). In Taiwan, profitability increased
after the late 1950s in the majority of manufacturing
sectors except traditional industries such as textiles and
wood products (Lin, 1973, cited by Rodrik, 1995).
Let us now look at the relation between
specialization and growth through a cross-country
analysis. The first question that arises is how to measure
the pattern of specialization. As the level of income of
a country rises, its trade pattern changes. Typically, the
economy changes from being a net importer of
manufactures to being a net exporter, and manufactures
increasingly dominate its foreign trade. As the level of
income affects the growth rate in ways which are
independent of the pattern of specialization, it would
5 This section is based in part on Ros (2000), chapter 9, sections 3
and 4.
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be useful to have an indicator of trade specialization
which isolates the effects of resource endowment from
those of the policies applied and excludes the influence
of the level of income on the trade pattern.
Such an indicator may be found in Chenery and
Syrquin (1986). It consists of their index of trade
orientation, which can be used to measure the bias
towards manufactures in the composition of exports of
goods, after adjustment for the income level and size
of each country.6  The index measures, then, the degree
to which an economy specializes in manufactures as a
result of factors other than size and income (resource
endowment and policies). This index is available for
1975, for 34 countries (including Hong Kong and
Taiwan)7 , many of which were semi-industrialized in
the 1970s.
We will also consider a smaller sample of 22
countries for which both the trade orientation index and
the Leamer index of intra-industry trade and other
features of foreign trade are available. These 22
countries were grouped according to their trade
orientation index as follows:
i) countries with a positive bias towards exports of
manufactures, mostly from East Asia and South-
ern Europe: Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Israel,
Japan, Morocco, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and
Yugoslavia;
ii) countries with a moderate bias towards exports of
primary goods, mostly including Latin American
and East Asian countries: Colombia, Costa Rica,
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey; and
iii) countries with a strong bias towards exports of
primary goods, mostly consisting of Latin Ameri-
can countries: Argentina, Brazil, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, Ivory Coast and Peru.
Table 1 summarizes the information available for this
smaller sample of 22 countries: for the sample in
question it reveals a positive relation between the bias
towards exports of manufactures and the investment
rate. Table 2 presents cross-country correlations for the
sample.
Table 3 gives correlations for the larger sample (34
countries); the correlation coefficient between the bias
towards manufactures and the investment rate is 0.35.
This is exactly what was implied by the models in
section II, which suggest that specialization in industries
with increasing returns (a bias towards manufactures)
should have a positive effect on the investment rate.
As already noted, another implication of these
models concerns the effect of the specialization pattern
on the rate of capital accumulation, for a given
investment rate. As table 2 shows, the correlation
between the trade orientation index (which measures
the degree to which an economy specializes in the
export of manufactures) and growth is very high (0.73):
higher than the correlation between the trade orientation
index and the investment rate. Also noteworthy is the
very significant coefficient of the trade orientation index
in a regression of the growth rate with this index, the
investment rate, and the initial level of GDP per worker:
g = 2.02 + 0.09 I/Y + 1.47 OC - 0.0002 Y/L60 R2 = 0.75
(3.73) (4.02) (4.39) (-4.42)
where g is the growth rate of the GDP per worker (1960-
1990); I/Y is the real investment rate (1970-1980); OC
is the trade orientation index of Chenery and Syrquin,
1975, and Y/L60 is the real GDP per worker in 1960. The
t statistics are given in parentheses.
This equation indicates that, for the same initial
income and investment rate, countries which specialized
in the export of manufactures grew faster during the
1960-1990 period than primary commodity exporters.
If we interpret sector 1 of the model in the first section
as a sector which makes intensive use of natural
resources and has few linkages with activities having
increasing returns, the equation illustrates the basic
implications of the model in terms of the effects of
investment allocation on growth. The initial level of
GDP per worker also has a very significant (negative)
coefficient in the regression. This suggests that in this
group of 34 semi-industrialized countries there is a
tendency towards convergence: other conditions being
equal, the countries with a lower level of income tended
to grow faster. As the models examined previously
indicate, however, this convergence was conditioned
by the specialization pattern: the economies specializing
in the export of manufactures converged towards high
levels of income faster than those specializing in
6 This means measuring, for a given country, the deviation between
the observed bias towards manufactures and the bias predicted for
a typical country of similar income level and size. The trade
orientation index of Chenery and Syrquin (1986) actually measures
the bias towards primary exports. What we have done is to use this
index by multiplying it by -1, which gives us the bias towards
manufactures.
7 Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Hong
Kong, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea,
Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay,
Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
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commodity exports. In reality, they were converging
towards a higher equilibrium level of income, as the
analysis made in section II suggests.
It may be noted that the results presented here tend
to confirm the findings of recent studies (Sachs and
Warner, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997), which show that,
after controlling for other variables, economies
specializing in the production and export of goods
making intensive use of natural resources tend to grow
more slowly than those specializing in the export of
manufactures. According to Sachs and Warner,
abundance of natural resources, as measured by the
percentage of GDP accounted for by exports making
intensive use of natural resources, has a negative effect
TABLE 1
22 countries: Trade orientation, investment and growtha
(Averages per group of countries)
Bias towards Bias towards
export of manufactures export of commodities
Moderate Strong
Trade orientation index 1975 0.45 –0.10 –0.45
Rate of investment 24.8 19.1 19.5
Growth rate 4.1 2.8 1.5
Foreign trade share 84.8 48.5 39.2
Trade intensity (Leamer 1) 0.08 0.04 –0.05
Index of intra-industry trade 0.56 0.30 0.17
Number of countries 10 6 6
a
 For definitions and sources, see text of article and notes to table 3.
TABLE 2
22 countries: Cross-country correlationsa
Trade orientation Intra- Trade Foreign trade
index 1975 industry trade intensity share
Trade orientation index 1975 1.00 0.69 0.42 0.35
Intra-industry trade 1.00 0.73 0.71
Trade intensity 1.00 0.85
Foreign trade share 1.00
a
 For definitions and sources, see text of article and notes to table 3.
TABLE 3
34 countries: Cross-country correlations
TO1975a I/Y70-80 Foreign trade Growthc
shareb
TO1975 1.00 0.35 0.33 0.73
I/Y70-80d 1.00 0.30 0.54
Foreign trade share 1.00 0.39
Growth 1.00
a
 TO1975 : Trade orientation 1975 (Chenery and Syrquin, 1986).
b
 (Exports + Imports) / nominal GDP. Average for 1970-1980 period (Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6).
c
 Growth : growth rate of real GDP per worker 1960-1990 (Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6).
Intra-industry trade: index of intra-industry trade 1982 (Leamer, 1988).
Trade intensity: adjusted index of trade intensity 1982, Leamer 1 (Leamer, 1988).
d
 I/Y70-80 : Share of investment in GDP. Average for 1970-1980 period ((Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6).
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on growth: an influence that the authors attribute to
“Dutch Disease”-type effects. These authors experiment
with other measures of abundance of natural resources
(such as the share of commodity exports in total exports,
or the amount of land per capita), with results that
confirm this negative relation. According to Sala-i-
Martin, exports of primary commodities as a proportion
of total exports is one of the few economic variables
which is systematically (negatively) correlated with
growth.
2. Trade openness, investment and growth
In their “sensitivity analysis” of cross-country growth
regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992) examined the
robustness of the empirical relations between long-term
growth and a variety of economic, political and
institutional indicators. Their findings were pessimistic.
Although there are many econometric specifications
in which various indicators are significantly correlated
with per capita growth rates,  almost all these
specifications are fragile in the sense that small
alterations in the “other” explanatory variables change
the results previously obtained. Only two relations pass
this test. One is the positive correlation between growth
and the investment rate (investment as a percentage of
GDP). The other is the positive correlation between the
share of foreign trade in GDP and the investment rate.
Table 3 presents results that support these conclusions
for the large sample of 34 countries: the positive
correlation between growth and the investment rate
(0.54) and that between the share of foreign trade and
the investment rate (0.30).
The first result is reassuring because it coincides
with economic theory. The second is a puzzle, however.
Firstly, it is important to note that the robust relation
found by Levine and Renelt is not between the
investment rate and trade barriers, but between the
investment rate and the share of foreign trade. The
relations between the investment rate (or the growth
rate) and various indicators of trade barriers or
distortions in foreign trade policy are not robust8 , so
the robust relation does not seem to reflect the effects
of trade policy. Secondly, when controlled for the
investment rate, there is no robust relation between the
share of foreign trade and growth (provided of course
that the indicator used is the share of exports and/or
imports). The fact that the robust relation is between
trade and the investment rate suggests that if trade
affects growth it does not do so through the conventional
channels involving resource allocation but through less
conventional channels involving positive effects on the
investment rate.
What these channels can be is not clear from the
existing literature. Romer (1990 a and b) suggests that
trade openness has a positive effect on research and
development expenditure and, by thus increasing the
rate of technological change, influences the investment
and growth rates. Other points of view stress the positive
effects of trade openness on technology transfer.9
Whatever the merits of these views, they hardly
represent a convincing explanation of Levine and
Renelt’s findings. One reason is that the trade openness
considered in these models does not refer to the share
of trade in GDP and therefore any attempt to provide an
explanation of the statistical relation between the share
of trade and the investment rate runs up against an old
objection recently restated by De Long and Summers
(1991). The share of trade is influenced by the size of a
country and its proximity to its trading partners. If
Belgium and the Netherlands were to merge, it would
be difficult to imagine how much the combined rate of
technical progress should go down (or increase) because
this new entity would be less “open” than each of the
two countries separately.10
Even if the objection against measuring trade
openness by the share of foreign trade were not decisive,
however, the following question remains: Why is the
robust correlation only between investment and trade
8 These indicators include “real exchange rate distortion” (Dollar,
1992), the average premium on the currency black market, and
Chenery and Syrquin’s trade openness index. In a more recent
review of the literature on trade policy and growth (after the
publication of Levine and Renelt’s article), Rodríguez and Rodrik
(1999) conclude that trade policy indicators lack statistical
significance in well-specified cross-country growth regressions.
9 At the same time, it can be argued that the effects of trade openness
depend on the specialization pattern induced by the greater
openness (as in the model in section II). In some North-South
models, such as that of Young (1991), trade openness can even
result in a slower rate of technological change in the South.
Moreover, foreign direct investment is a major vehicle for
technology transfer but there is no clear relation between trade
openness and openness to foreign direct investment.
10 It should be noted that De Long and Summers’ observation is
not an objection against models in which trade openness -in the
sense of the absence of trade barriers- has a positive effect on
investment. It is rather an objection against the use of the share of
foreign trade in GDP as a measure of trade openness. The implication,
however, is that we must not interpret the correlation between
investment and the share of foreign trade as evidence in support of
models in which openness stimulates investment.
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share and not between investment and other (more
appropriate) measures of trade openness? The analysis
made in this and earlier sections suggests various
hypotheses which can provide a convincing explanation
of the positive relation between trade share and the
investment rate.11  Our line of argument will be that the
link between trade and investment involves the
specialization pattern as determined by policies and
factor endowment, including natural resources. The
studies on differences in growth rates between countries
have ignored these links because, with a few recent
exceptions, they have ignored the influence these two
factors (industrial policy and resource endowment)
exert through their effects on trade orientation.12
The nub of the argument is that the positive
correlation between trade share and the investment rate
is measured by the trade orientation; in other words,
the explanation of the positive relation is that the trade
share and investment rate are both positively affected
by a bias towards manufactures in trade orientation.
We have already analysed and illustrated the effects of
trade orientation on the investment rate. We will now
look at the effects of trade orientation on trade share.
Table 1 shows a positive relation between these two
variables, while tables 2 and 3 show positive coefficients
of correlation of 0.35 and 0.33.
Why should a specialization pattern based on the
export of manufactures have a positive effect on trade
share? One reason is the positive effect that
specialization in activities with increasing returns can
have on trade creation. The increasing returns favour
the expansion of intra-industry trade -two-way trade
flows of similar products with economies of
specialization. Countries with a bigger bias towards
manufactures in their exports usually have higher
indexes of intra-industry trade. The correlation
coefficient between the two indexes, as shown in
table 2, is 0.69.
A second reason may be the presence of “Dutch
Disease”-type effects of exports of primary commodi-
ties. What the “Dutch Disease” models imply is that
commodity-exporting countries tend to be less open
(other things being equal), because in the long-term
equilibrium they have bigger non-tradeable goods sec-
tors (see Ros, 2000, chapter 8). It may be noted in this
respect that trade orientation towards manufactures has
a positive relation with Leamer’s trade openness in-
dex. This is an adjusted trade intensity index which
represents the difference between the observed level
of trade (not the trade pattern) and the level predicted
by a Heckscher-Ohlin model, which includes factor
endowment and distance to markets. The positive rela-
tion with trade orientation indicates that the more bi-
ased the trade orientation is towards commodity ex-
ports, the lower the index of trade intensity tends to be,
probably because of the existence of larger non-trade-




This study offers an analytical framework for analysing
the relations between the specialization pattern and
growth, together with empirical evidence which does
indeed suggest that the specialization pattern is an im-
portant determinant in the growth process. The analy-
sis showed the scope and limitations of industrial policy.
On the one hand, it showed how an industrial policy
which reallocates resources towards sectors with po-
tential to exploit economies of scale and specialization
can raise the growth rate of an economy by increasing
the capital yield and capital accumulation rate. On the
other hand, it clearly revealed that the efficacy of in-
dustrial policy depends on the presence of certain con-
ditions –especially physical and human capital endow-
ment and a sufficiently broad market for sectors with
economies of scale and specialization– which do in-
deed allow the reallocation of resources to raise the
profit rate in the new spearhead sectors.
11 We have already mentioned the argument put forward by Rodrik
(1995) whereby a higher investment rate can lead to a higher trade
share as a result of an increase in imports of capital goods in
economies which are in the process of industrialization. In this
argument, the causality is from investment to trade and not in the
opposite direction. In the following paragraphs of this article our
ideas will follow a different direction which is complementary to
the foregoing.
12 As already mentioned, the exceptions include Sachs and Warner
(1997) and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
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The empirical analysis tended to confirm that
economies oriented towards the export of manufactures
tend to grow faster than those oriented towards
commodity exports. Among the semi-industrialized
countries, there are no examples of super-growth based
on the export of goods making intensive use of natural
resources.13  This does not mean that countries with an
abundance of such resources must change their
specialization pattern in order to grow faster. Efforts in
this direction would probably be a failure in many of
them, precisely because the efficacy of industrial policy
is conditioned by factor endowment. Nor does it mean
that these countries with an abundance of natural
resources are doomed to grow more slowly than
countries with a bias towards exports of manufactures,
since they can speed up their growth process by trying
to influence other determinants of that process.
Finally, it should be noted that in this article the
economic policy implications are limited by the type
of externalities considered. The external effects of a
pecuniary and dynamic nature which take place
between producers of capital-intensive goods and
producers of intermediate goods operating in conditions
of increasing returns give rise to flaws in coordination
whose solution calls for public intervention. However,
the study did not deal with other types of externalities
and market flaws (especially in factor markets) which
justify interventions generally included under the
heading of industrial policy.
(Original: Spanish)
Appendix: The formal model14
There are two sectors producing tradeable goods in the
economy (denoted by 1 and 2). The technology used in both
sectors is of the Cobb-Douglas type:
Q1 = K1bL11–b Q2 = K2aI1–a
where K is the capital input and L is the labour input. Let us
assume that a > b, that is to say, sector 2 is more capital-
intensive than sector 1. I represents the input consisting of a
set of intermediate goods:
I = (Σ (1/n)Iiσ)1/s 0 < σ < 1,
where n is the number of intermediate goods, assumed to be
given. The sector producing these intermediate goods (sector 3)
does so using labour in conditions of increasing returns to scale:
Ii = Li
1+µ µ >0 [1]
where Li is the labour input.
The enterprises in the three sectors maximize their benefits,
taking the prices of the inputs as given. The enterprises in sectors
1 and 2 also take the prices of the goods produced as given. In
both sectors the capital stock is predetermined. The levels of
use of the factors variable in the short term are derived from the
first-order conditions for the maximization of benefits:
L1 = [(1–b)p1 / w]1/b K1 [2]
I = (1–a)1/a (p3 / p2)–1/a K [3]
where w is wages, p1 and p2 are the prices of goods 1 and 2,
and p3 is the (minimum) cost of a basket of intermediate
goods such that I = 1.
In sector 3, the producers operate in conditions of




 = D pi
–η η > 1 [4]
where D reflects the position on the demand curve and η is
the price elasticity of demand faced by individual producers.
This elasticity is a function of σ, a and n, and for large values
of n is given approximately by 1/(1-σ). The inequality in [4]
is due to the parametric restrictions 0 < a < 1 and 0 < σ < 1.
Based on the demand function in [4] and production
function [1], the optimal price decision of an individual
producer of intermediate goods is a profit margin (π) over
the marginal cost (ω):
pi = (1 + π) ω [5]
where:
1 + π = [η / (η–1)] ω = w/(1+µ) Ii µ / (1+µ)
Equations [4] and [5] are combined with the input demand
of sector 2 (equation [3]) to find a solution for I, p3 and D.
Using [1] and the solution for I, we obtain the level of
employment in sector 3:
L3 = [(1 / n)1–f G K2a p2 / w]1/f [6]
G = (1–a) (1 + µ) (η – 1) /η
f  = a – µ (1 – a)
13 Although Botswana can hardly be described as a semi-
industrialized economy, it comes closest to being an exception to
this. The sustained progress of this economy seems to have been
the result of a series of mining booms (diamond mining) within
the context of a stable macroeconomic policy.
14 This appendix is based on Ros (2000), chapters 5 (sections 2 and
3), 8 (section 3) and 9 (section 1).
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Equilibrium in the labour market
Equilibrium in the labour market means a uniform rate of
wages in sectors 1 and 3, with full employment of the labour
force (L): L = L1 + L3. Let us consider what happens with
the equilibrium wage when capital is reallocated from sector
1 to sector 2. At the initial level of wages, the reduction in
the stock of capital in sector 1 causes a decline in the demand
for labour in that sector. Using the labour demand equation
for L1 and keeping wages constant, the reduction in
employment in sector 1 is given by:
–dL3 = [(1-b) p1 / w]1/b (–dK1)
The greater stock of capital in sector 2 causes an increase
in the demand for labour in sector 3. Using the demand
function for L3, the increase in employment in sector 3 at the
initial wage level is:
dL3 = [(1/n)1–f G p2 / w]1/f (a/f) K2 (a/f)–1 dK2
with -dK1 = dK2, on the assumption that the reallocation
does not affect the total stock of capital. Whether the change
gives rise to an excess supply or demand for labour depends
on the size of (-dL1) compared with (dL3). Obviously, the
answer depends on the level of K2. When K2 is small, sector
3 is also small and produces at very high costs, in view of
the existence of economies of scale in this sector. As the
relative price of intermediate inputs (p3/p2) is very high, the
capital intensity (K/I) in sector 2 is also very high, even
though the absolute value of K2 is small. With a high value
of the ratio (K/I), the increase in the stock of capital in sector
2 has only small indirect effects on employment in sector 3.
The reduction in the demand for labour in sector 1 is then
greater than the increase in the demand for labour in sector
3. A reallocation of capital from sector 1 to sector 2 thus
tends to create an excess supply of labour, and this requires
a reduction in wages in order to clear the labour market.
In contrast, when the level of K2 is high, the indirect
effects of the expansion of sector 2 on employment may
outweigh the reduction in the demand for labour in sector 1.
The greater scale of sector 3 has made it more productive
and reduced the relative price of intermediate goods. With a
lower level of capital intensity (K/I), the expansion of sector
2 at the expense of sector 1 may then have the effect of giving
rise to excess demand for labour and increasing the
equilibrium wage.
We can formally verify that a reallocation of capital to
sector 2 should first of all have the effect of lowering the
equilibrium wage but later on have the effect of raising it.
Substituting the labour demand functions in the full
employment condition, we can derive an equilibrium locus
for the labour market which shows the equilibrium wage for
different compositions of the capital stock. Keeping K
constant, the slope of this locus in the space (logw, logK2) is:
dlogw / dlogK2 = [a / f –(K2 / K1)(L1 / L3)] / [1 / f + (1 / b)(L1 / L3)]
where L1/L3, using the labour demand functions, is given
by:
L1 / L3 = (B K1 / A K2a/f) w1/f–1/b
B = [(1–b) p1]1/b A = [(1/n)1–f Gp2]1/f
As we can see, the slope of this locus is negative, tending
towards zero at low levels of K2 but becoming positive and
tending towards “a” at high levels of K2 (on condition that
such high values exist because of the size of the total capital
stock). Consequently, the equilibrium value of wages first
goes down as K2 increases and subsequently rises, becoming
a growing function of K2 (see figure 1).
Equilibrium in the capital market
Using the definition of the profit rate and the first-order
conditions for maximizing benefits in sectors 1 and 2, the
rates of profitability in these sectors may be expressed as
inverse functions of the wage rate:
r1 = b (p1 / p2) [(1–b) p1 / w](1–b) / b [7]
r2 = a K2
µ (1/a)/f
 [(1/n) G / (w/p2)] (1–f) / f [8]
Capital is assumed to be mobile between sectors 1 and
2. Equilibrium in the capital market requires full use of the
total stock of capital (K) and equal rates of profitability in
the two sectors using capital (insofar as these two sectors
exist side by side):
K = K1 + K2 r1 = r2
By replacing the expressions for the profit rate in the
condition of equality between the two rates, we can derive
the equation for an equilibrium locus in the capital market.
In the space (w, K2), this locus shows the value of K2 for
each given value of wages and the corresponding composition
of the capital stock which gives the same rate of profitability
in sectors 1 and 2. So, if there is an increase in wages, how
must the composition of the capital stock change in order to
maintain equilibrium in the capital market? Intuitively, the
answer to this question depends on which of the two sectors
makes the most intensive use of labour. Higher wages will
naturally tend to cause a bigger reduction in the profitability
of the sector which makes the most intensive use of labour.
The reallocation required would therefore depend on the
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effects of K2 on the relative rates of profitability.15  The
problem is that in this model it is not clear which of the two
sectors makes the most intensive direct and indirect use of
labour. Although the use of capital in sector 2 is more
intensive than in sector 1 (in the sense that a > b), the
parameter of increasing returns (µ) may be sufficiently great
to cause the “indirect” share of labour in sector 2 to be greater
than the share in sector 1. This is because of the presence of
returns to scale in sector 3, which causes the sum of the shares
of capital and labour in the “integrated” sectors 2 and 3 to be
greater than unity.
Formally, the slope of the locus for capital market
equilibrium in the space (logw, logK2) is given by:
dlogw / dlogK2 = [µ (1–a) / f] / [(1–a)(1+µ) / f–(1–b)/b]
We have, in fact, two different cases, depending on the
technology parameters for the three sectors. Section A of figure
1 shows the case where b > f. This means that (1-a)(1+µ) >
(1-b), that is to say, that the “indirect” share of labour in sector
2 is greater than the share of labour in sector 1. In this case, an
increase in wages (K2 being given) reduces the rate of
profitability in sector 2 more than in sector 1. An increase in
K2 (which has a positive effect on r2) is therefore required in
order to restore equality of profit rates. This means that the
slope of the locus is positive.
In the second case (section B of figure 1), we have b < f.
This means that (1-a) (1+µ) < (1-b): in other words, the
“indirect” share of labour in sector 2 is less than in sector 1.
In this case, an increase in wages (K2 being given) will reduce
the profitability of sector 1 more than that of sector 2. This
requires a reduction in K2 (which reduces r2) in order to
restore equality of rates of profitability. The slope of the locus
is then negative.
In the two configurations shown in figure 1, the area
to the right of the locus r1 = r2 is such that sector 2 is
more profitable than sector 1. This is because it is an area
in which K2 is relatively large for each given level of
wages, and K2 has a positive effect on the relative
profitability of sector 2. Thus, on the right of the locus
capital will flow to sector 2 and the ratio K2/K1 will tend
to increase. To the left of the locus r1 = r2, in contrast, the
profitability of sector 2 is less than that of sector 1 and
capital will flow to sector 1. It follows from this that in
both cases the composit ion of the capital  stock
corresponding to the intersection of the two loci is an
unstable equilibrium. As the figure shows, allocation of
the capital stock with a level of K2 which is higher than at
the intersection generates a profit rate in sector 2 which is
higher than that of sector 1. Capital thus moves to sector
2 and further depresses the relative profitability of sector
1. Similar mechanisms, in the opposite direction, operate
logK2
FIGURE 1














 If there is no effect –that is to say, if K2 does not appear in the
equation for the rate of profitability of sector 2– there will be no
reallocation capable of restoring the equality of the rates of
profitability. In this case, the locus would be a horizontal straight
line corresponding to the single value of wages consistent with
equality of the rates of profitability. As may be seen, this is the
case if µ = 0: that is to say, if the technology of the integrated
sector 2/3 has constant returns to scale.
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for capital allocations in which K2 is lower than at the
intersection.16
Multiple equilibria
We can also verify that when the two curves intersect, this
intersection is unique.17  Consequently, if an intersection
exists there will be two stable equilibria in which the whole
of the capital stock is invested in one of the two sectors. In
one equilibrium, the economy is completely specialized in
sector 1. As in this case there is no sector 3, not only the
whole of the capital stock but also the whole of the labour
force is employed in sector 1. In the other equilibrium, the
economy is specialized in the production and export of the
goods produced in sector 2, and as there is no sector 1 the
whole of the labour force is employed in sector 3.
In our economy, there is always an equilibrium with
specialization in sector 1, regardless of whether or not there
are multiple equilibria. As already noted in the article, this is
because of the assumption that sector 1 does not use
intermediate inputs produced under conditions of increasing
returns. At low levels of K2, the profitability rate of sector 2
will tend towards zero, while it will remain positive in sector
1 however large the capital stock is. There are therefore capital
allocations at sufficiently low levels of K2 for which sector 1
is more profitable than sector 2.
As there is always an equilibrium with specialization in
sector 1, it follows that the existence of an equilibrium with
specialization in sector 2 ensures the existence of an
intersection and hence also ensures the existence of multiple
equilibria. Likewise, an equilibrium with specialization in
sector 2 exists if the profitability of sector 2, when the whole
of the capital stock is invested in that sector, is greater than
that of sector 1 (valued at the market equilibrium wage
corresponding to L = L3). Let us first of all consider the wage
with specialization in sector 2 (w2*). Using [6] and the
conditions L3 = L and K2 = K, and solving the equation for
the wage, we have:
w2* = G (1/n)1–f p2 Ka/Lf [ 9]
Substituting [9] in [8], and making w2 * equal to w2 and
K2 equal to K, we obtain the profitability rate for the
equilibrium with specialization in sector 2 (r2*):
r2* = a (L/n)1–f / K1–a [10]
The profitability rate in sector 1, valued at wage w2*, is
obtained by substituting [9] in [7]:
r2
1
 = b (p1 / p2)1/b [(1–b) n1–f Lf / G Ka](1–b)/b [11]
It should be noted that the profitability rate of sector 1,
r2
1
, valued at wage w2*, is an increasing function of the
number of producers of intermediate goods (n). A larger
number of producers increases the unit cost of each of the
intermediate goods and reduces the demand for labour in
sector 3. This has a negative effect on w2* and thereby tends
to increase the rate of profitability in sector 1, which does
not use intermediate goods. This negative effect on wages is
offset in the case of the profitability rate of sector 2, since a
larger number of producers implies higher costs in sector 2:
r2* is a decreasing function of the number of producers (n).
Using [10] and [11], the condition for r* > r21 and,
hence, for the existence of multiple equilibria, is:
Ka-b > K* a-b = (b/a)b (p1/p2) [(1–b) /G]1–b n1–f Lf–b [12]
The existence of multiple equilibria depends on the
endowment of capital and labour and the relative prices. In
particular, the total stock of capital must be sufficiently large
to ensure that, when the whole of that stock is invested in
sector 2, the price of intermediate goods is sufficiently low
to make that sector viable. The critical value (K*) of the total
stock of capital increases with the relative price (p1/p2), which
increases the profitability of sector 1. That profitability also
increases with the number of enterprises (n) in sector 3, which
adversely affects the profitability of sector 2. The effect of
the size of the labour force on the critical value of the capital
stock depends on the sign of (f-b), that is to say, on the
“indirect” share of labour in sector 2 compared with sector 1.
Let us assume that the conditions for the existence of
multiple equilibria are fulfilled, and let us then compare the
wages and profitability rates in the two equilibria. In the
equilibrium with specialization in sector 2, the rates of wages
and profitability are given by equations [9] and [10]. In the
equilibrium with specialization in sector 1, we have K1 = K
and L1 = L. Using equations [2] and [7], the wages and rates
of profitability in the equilibrium with specialization in sector
1 are:
16 The instability of the capital allocation corresponding to the
intersection is due to the existence of increasing returns to scale in
the integrated sector 2/3. At constant returns to scale, the labour
market equilibrium locus has a negative slope (if the integrated
sector 2/3 is the capital-intensive sector), while the capital market
equilibrium locus is a horizontal straight line (see footnote 15). As
the reader can see, in this case the equilibrium corresponding to
the intersection is stable.
17 In case A, this is because the capital market equilibrium locus
has a more pronounced slope than the labour market equilibrium
locus at high levels of K2. The necessary and sufficient conditions
for this are that a > b and f > 0. In case B, the intersection is
unique because the capital market locus has a steeper slope, at low
levels of K2, than the labour market locus.
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w1* = (1–b) p1 (K / L)b [13]
r1* = b (p1 / p2) (L / K)1–b [14]
Comparison of [10] and [14] shows that r2* is greater
than r1* if:
Ka–b > K**a–b = (b/a) (p1/p2) n1–f Lf–b [15]
Comparing [12] and [15] we can establish that K* >
K**. The assumption that a > b and the second-order
condition for a maximum of producers of intermediate goods
guarantee this inequality.18  Consequently, when an
equilibrium with specialization in sector 2 exists (K > K*),
the rate of profitability in this equilibrium is greater than in
the equilibrium with specialization in sector 1 (since K is
then greater than K**).
Examination of [9] and [13] shows that for w2* to be
greater than w1* the total stock of capital must be such that:
Ka–b > K***a–b = (1–b) (p1 / p2) n1–f L f–b / G [16]
From [12] and [16] we can establish that K*** > K*.19
The existence of an equilibrium with specialization in sector
2 does not ensure that the wages in that equilibrium are higher
than in the equilibrium with specialization in sector 1. For
this to take place, the capital stock must be greater than K***.
In that case, with K > K*** and hence with K greater than
K* and K**, there is an equilibrium with specialization in
sector 2 which has both profitability rates and wages higher
than in the equilibrium with specialization in sector 1.
18 K* > K** if the following condition is fulfilled:
(1–b)/b > [(1–a)/a] (1+µ) (1–1/η)
a > b means that (1-b)/b > (1-a)/a. In order for the second-order
condition for the maximization of benefits among producers of
intermediate goods to be fulfilled, it is necessary that (1+µ)(1-1/η)
< 1. Together, these inequalities ensure the fulfillment of the above
condition.
19 This requires, as in the previous case:
(1–b)/b > [(1–a)/a] (1+µ) (1–1/η)
This inequality is guaranteed by the conditions mentioned earlier
(a > b and the second-order condition for the maximization of
benefits among the producers of intermediate goods).
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